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Abstract
Much work in computer science has adopted competitive analy-
sis as a tool for decision making under uncertainty. In this work we
extend competitive analysis to the context of multi-agent systems.
Unlike classical competitive analysis where the behavior of an agent’s
environment is taken to be arbitrary, we consider the case where an
agent’s environment consists of other agents. These agents will usu-
ally obey some (minimal) rationality constraints. This leads to the
definition of rational competitive analysis. We introduce the concept
of rational competitive analysis, and initiate the study of competitive
analysis for multi-agent systems. We also discuss the application of
rational competitive analysis to the context of bidding games, as well
as to the classical one-way trading problem.
1 Introduction
Competitive analysis is a central tool for the design and analysis of algo-
rithms and protocols for decision making under uncertainty [3]. It is a well
studied and widely applicable approach that fits the framework of qualitative
decision-making in AI (see e.g. [6, 4]). The competitive analysis approach
attempts to minimize the ratio between the payoff an agent obtains and the
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payoff he could have obtained had he known the behavior of the environment.
For example, consider the following trading problem (see [3], Chapter 14).
An agent who holds $100 may wish to exchange them for British pounds. At
each point in time, e.g. every minute in between 8AM and 4PM, an exchange
ratio of dollars and pounds is announced. This ratio changes dynamically,
and in an unpredicted manner. The agent would need to choose the time
in which it will trade his $100 for pounds. Notice that if the agent would
have known the sequence of exchange rates, e, then he could have chosen a
strategy o(e) that maximizes his payoff. If the agent chooses a strategy s,
then we can compute the ratio of the payoffs obtained by o(e) and s. We
can do similarly for every sequence of exchange rates e′. Based on this, we
can compute the highest (i.e. worst) ratio, over all possible sequences, that
might be obtained when we compare optimal strategies to s. This ratio is
denoted by R(s). According to the competitive analysis approach, the agent
will apply the competitive ratio decision criterion: he will choose a strategy s
for which R(s) is minimal. This decision criterion may be quite helpful when
we lack probabilistic assumptions about the environment. For example, as-
sume that the minimal value of R(·), which is obtained by some strategy s,
is 2. Then, by selecting s, the agent guarantees himself a payoff which is at
least half of the optimal payoff that he could have obtained had he known
the actual environment behavior.
The competitive ratio has also an additive variant (also termed minimax
regret [11]), where we replace the term ”ratio” by the term ”difference”
in the definition of R. So, in our example, if a strategy s that minimizes
R(·) obtains a competitive difference/regret of 20, then this implies that by
performing s the agent gets a payoff (e.g. worth in British pounds) which
is at most 20 lower than what he could have obtained had he known the
behavior of the environment. In the sequel, we will use the additive version
of the competitive ratio decision criterion.
Competitive analysis has been applied to a variety of classical problems
in computer science, such as the k-server problem [10] and paging [7], as
well as to more general algorithmic problems [2]. In all of these studies
the environment that the agent acts in is non-strategic, and therefore does
not assume to follow any ”rational” behavior. In this paper we extend the
concept of competitive analysis to the context of multi-agent systems. In
a multi-agent system the environment in which an agent takes his decision
consists of other ”rational” agents. Following previous work on competitive
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analysis, our approach is non-Bayesian and normative; we would like to find
a decision rule for the agent that will rely as little as possible on assumptions
about the behavior of his environment. Therefore, we adopt the requirement
that agent A should rule out a behavior b1 of agent B only if b1 is dominated
by another behavior, b2, of that agent. Dominated behaviors are purely
irrational in any decision making model. The agent will choose his behavior
according to the competitive ratio decision rule. However, he should consider
only rational behaviors of the other agents; a behavior of an agent will be
considered irrational if and only if it is dominated by another behavior of it.
In section 2 we describe bidding games, a family of games that will serve
us for the illustration of the basic concepts developed in this paper. Bidding
games are representatives of k-price auctions, a central class of economic
mechanisms [12]. In section 3 we present a competitive analysis of bidding
games. In section 4 we introduce rational competitive analysis, a new tool
for normative decision making, that generalizes competitive analysis to the
context of rational environments, and apply it to bidding games. In section 5
we consider repeated (multi-stage) games. We present several results on the
relationships between (rational) competitive analysis of repeated games and
the competitive analysis of the particular (one-shot) games they consist of.
Then, in section 6, we discuss and study variants and modifications of the
one-way trading problem, using rational competitive analysis. In particular,
we study the multi-agent one-way trading problem.
2 Bidding games
We start by recalling the general definition of a (strategic form) game.
Definition 2.1 A game is a tuple G = 〈N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, S = {Si}
n
i=1, {Ui}
n
i=1〉,
where N is a set of n ≥ 2 players, Si is the set of strategies available to player
i, and Ui : Π
n
j=1Sj → R is the utility function of player i.
In a game, each player selects a strategy from a set of available strategies.
The tuple of strategies selected, one by each player, determines the payoff of
each of the agents1 (as prescribed by the utility functions).
1Here and elsewhere we use the terms player and agent interchangeably.
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In a bidding game, a center attempts to obtain a service from a set of
potential suppliers. Each such supplier has a certain cost associated with
that service. This cost is taken to be an integer between K − T and K,
where K and T are w.l.o.g integers, K > T > 0. Each agent will offer his
service and ask for a payment in the range in between K−T and K. We will
associate the request for payment ofK−i with the integer i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ T .
The center will choose as the service provider the supplier with the lowest
asking price. There are various ways for determining the payment to that
agent; in particular, the agent can be paid his asking price, the second lowest
asking price, or the third lowest asking price. We assume that the costs for
providing the service by each of the agents are common knowledge among
them, although the center might not be familiar with these costs. Although
this is quite natural for the above procurement problem, other assumptions
can be treated similarly.
Our definition of bidding games will capture the above, by considering a
fully isomorphic situation, namely: the auctioning of a good. The good is
held by the center. Each agent has a valuation (i.e. maximal willingness to
pay) for the good. Each agent needs to decide on his bid. The center will
allocate the good to the agent with the highest bid (rather than to the agent
with the lowest asking price, as in the isomorphic procurement problem).
Formally, we have:
Definition 2.2 Given a set of n players, and an integer T >> 1, a bidding
game is determined by the tuple B=(x1, . . . , xn, k) where xi =
li
T
for some
integer 0 ≤ li ≤ T , and 1 ≤ k ≤ n is an integer. Player i’s strategy in B
is a decision about bi ∈ [0, T ]. Given a strategy profile b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn)
denote by b[i] the i-th order statistic of this tuple. Let M(b) be the number of
elements of b that equals b[1]. Then, Ui(b) =
1
M(b)
(xi −
b[k]
T
) if bi = b[1], and
Ui(b) = 0 otherwise.
In the above formalism, xi is the valuation of agent i (that is normalized
to the interval [0,1]), while bi denotes the bid made by agent i. The payment
made by the winner is determined by the parameter k. If k = 1 we get
the standard high-bid wins (or first-price) auction; if k = 2 then we get the
famous Vickrey (second-price) auction, while if k = 3 we get the case of
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third-price auctions.2
For ease of presentation we will assume that 2 ≤ li < T for every 1 ≤ i ≤
n, that i 6= j implies li 6= lj, and that T ≥ n.
3 Competitive Analysis
In a game, agent i is facing an environment that consists of the other agents.
The actions to be selected by these agents are not under the control of i. Fol-
lowing the literature on competitive analysis, the competitive ratio decision
rule may be used in order to choose an action for that agent.
Definition 3.1 Given a game G, and a strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈
Πnj=1Sj, the regret of player i is given by Regi(si, s−i) = maxt∈SiUi(s1, . . . , si−1, t, si+1, . . . , sn)−
Ui(s). A strategy s ∈ Si is a competitive strategy for agent i if s ∈ argmint∈Simaxq∈S−iRegi(t, q),
where S−i denotes the possible strategy profiles of players in N \ {i}.
Given the above definition we are interested in applying competitive anal-
ysis to bidding games. We now present three claims about competitive anal-
ysis of bidding games. These claims are associated with the competitive
analysis of 1st,2nd, and 3rd-price auctions, respectively.
Claim 3.1 Given the bidding game B=(x1, . . . , xn, 1), a competitive strategy
for agent i yields a regret value of α
T
, where α equals the upper integer value
of li−1
2
.
Basic idea behind proof: Agent i can lose by submitting a bid that is higher
than his valuation. On the other hand, by submitting a bid that is below
li − 1 agent i might lose, since agent j 6= i might submit li − 1 as a winning
bid. Since agents may submit the bid 0, agent i will minimize his regret by
submitting a bid that equals (the upper integer value of) half of the difference
between li − 1 and 0.
Claim 3.2 Given the bidding game B=(x1, . . . , xn, 2) a competitive strategy
for agent i yields a zero regret.
Basic idea behind proof: Here the optimal strategy for an agent, regardless
of what the others do, is to send his actual valuation as his bid; this is a well
known property of the Vickrey auction [13]. As a result we get a regret of 0.
2Third-price auctions have been shown to have appealing properties in the context of
Internet Auctions [12].
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Claim 3.3 Given the bidding game B=(x1, . . . , xn, 3), and assume w.l.o.g
that x1 > x2 > · · · > xn, then agent j’s competitive strategy is to send the
bid min(2lj , T ).
Basic idea behind proof: Given that agents may submit the bid 0, agent j
might reach a regret of lj
T
if he is not the winner. Submitting however a bid
that is higher than 2lj may also lead to a regret of
lj
T
, given that the agents
may submit 2lj as their bids. Combining these observations, we get that
submitting the bid min(2lj , T ) is the competitive strategy.
4 Rational Competitive Analysis
Although competitive analysis is a most powerful concept from a non-Bayesian
normative perspective, it may be quite restrictive when we consider decision-
making in multi-agent systems. Following the spirit of competitive analysis
for normative decision making, we refrain from using probabilistic assump-
tions and game-theoretic equilibrium analysis.3 However, one can still im-
prove on the use of competitive analysis by considering minimal rationality
requirements.
Definition 4.1 Given a game G = 〈N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, {Si}
n
i=1, {Ui}
n
i=1〉, we
say that a strategy si ∈ Si weakly dominates a strategy s
′
i ∈ Si if Ui(si, t) ≥
Ui(s
′
i, t) for every strategy profile t of the players in N \ {i}, and there exists
such strategy profile t′ for which Ui(si, t
′) > Ui(s
′
i, t
′). A strategy s ∈ Si will
be called rational is there is no other strategy s¯ ∈ Si that weakly dominates
it. Given a game G, the set of rational strategies for player i will be denoted
by Rat(Si).
In any reasonable model agents will choose only from the set of non-
dominated strategies. Our idea is therefore to combine the powerful idea of
competitive analysis and this minimal requirement of rationality, in order to
re-introduce competitive analysis into the framework of multi-agent systems.
Definition 4.2 A strategy s ∈ Si is a rationally competitive strategy if
s ∈ argmint∈Simaxq∈Rat(S−i)Regi(t, q), where Rat(S−i) denotes the possible
3The debate about whether competitive ratio and non-Bayesian decision making are
expressive or useful for normative or descriptive objectives is beyond the scope of this
paper; see [5] for sound and complete axiomatization of the competitive ratio decision
criterion.
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rational strategy profiles of players in N \ {i}, i.e. each player j ∈ N \ {i}
chooses its strategy from Rat(Sj).
Basically, a rationally competitive strategy applies the competitive ratio
decision criterion, while taking into account only rational activities of the
environment. As the following claims illustrate, rational competitive analysis
introduces an improved approach to normative decision making.
Claim 4.1 Given the bidding game B=(x1, . . . , xn, 1), a rational competitive
strategy for agent i yields a regret of α
T
, where α equals the upper integer value
of
min(li,maxj;j 6=ilj)−2
2
.
Basic idea behind proof: We observe that any strategy that tells agent j to
submit a bid which is greater than or equals to his valuation is dominated
by the strategy of submitting his valuation minus 1. Given our assumptions
about the possible valuations, all other strategies, excluding the strategy of
submitting the bid 0, are not dominated. As a result, from the perspective
of agent i, if his valuation is the highest one, he will minimize his regret if
he will make a bid that is half of the distance between maxj;j 6=ilj − 1 and 1.
If agent i’s valuation is not the highest one then he will minimize his regret
(again, taking into account the assumptions on possible valuations) if he will
make a bid in between li − 1 and 1.
Notice that rational competitive analysis allows us to improve upon the
type of reasoning carried out in claim 3.1. Technically, in the case of a bidding
game with k = 1, rationality implies that we need to take the minimum
between li and the highest other agents’ valuation in our analysis, rather
than consider li only.
Claim 4.2 Given the bidding game B=(x1, . . . , xn, 2) a rational competitive
strategy for agent i yields a zero regret.
As we can see, unlike the major effect of the rationality assumption in
the case of a first-price auction, there is no change in the analysis in the case
of a second-price auction. In the case of a third-price auction, we see again
the effect of the revised notion:
Claim 4.3 Given the bidding game B=(x1, . . . , xn, 3), and assume w.l.o.g
that x1 > x2 > · · · > xn, then a rational competitive strategy for agent
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j (j = 1, 2), is to submit the bid min(2lj − l[3], T ), where l[3] corresponds
to the 3rd highest xk; a zero-regret rational competitive strategy for agent
i, 3 ≤ i ≤ n, is to submit li.
Basic idea behind proof: First, observe that any strategy where the agent
submits a bid that is below that agent’s valuation is dominated by the strat-
egy that tells him to submit his actual valuation as his bid. As a result, for
agents 3, 4, . . . , n there is a 0 regret in submitting their actual valuations as
their bids. Let us assume that agent i (where i is 1 or 2) submits a bid,
then it can lose
li−l[3]
T
if it turns out not be the highest bidder (since agent
j submits a higher bid). On the other hand, by submitting the bid bi > li a
loss of bi−li
T
may be caused, since (from the perspective of agent i) two other
agents may submit the bid bi. This implies that the bid min(2li− l[3], T ) will
minimize this agent’s regret.
As we can see, in the case of k = 3 as well, rational competitive analysis for
bidding games leads to an improved normative approach to decision making.
In particular, the competitive strategy of Claim 3.3 specifies a too high bid,
and is not a rationally competitive strategy; as a result, it fails to serve in a
multi-agent context.
5 Rational competitive analysis in repeated
games: folk theorems
We first recall the notion of finitely repeated games [9].
Definition 5.1 Given an integer l > 0 and a game G = 〈N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, S =
{Si}
n
i=1, {Ui}
n
i=1〉, a repeated game RG = (G, l) with respect to G is a game
where G is repeatedly played l times. RG consists of the following strategies
and utility functions: a strategy of agent i in RG determines the strategy of
G to be taken by i in the k-th iteration of G, as a function of the history
of strategies of G selected by the others in iterations 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. Given
a tuple of strategies of RG, one for each agent, the payoff for agent i is the
sum of its payoffs along the l iterations. A sub-game of a repeated game RG
is a repeated game that starts from iteration 1 ≤ q ≤ l of RG and consists of
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l − q + 1 iterations. A (rationally) competitive strategy in RG is a strategy
that is a (rationally) competitive strategy at each of the sub-games of RG.4
Repeated games have been of much interest in the game-theory literature,
due to the fact they enable to study agents’ actions as a function of past
events and other agents’ actions. The study of repeated games is central to
the understanding of basic issues in coordination and cooperation (e.g. [1]),
as well as for the study of learning in games (e.g. [8]).
One of the central challenges for the study of repeated games is to estab-
lish general theorems (titled folk-theorems) that explain/recommend behav-
ior in these (repeated) games by means of solution concepts for the games
they consist of. In our case, it would be of interest to understand what will
be a rationally competitive strategy in a repeated game, and try to relate it
to the competitive analysis of the simple one-shot game that takes place at
each iteration.
We now present a general result about competitive analysis in repeated
games. For ease of presentation we will assume that G is a two-player game,
where all payoffs are distinct. We will also assume w.l.o.g that all payoffs are
non-negative. Given a repeated game (G, l), let us denote the highest payoff
for agent i in G by hi(G), and the second highest payoff of agent i in G by
shi(G).
Theorem 5.1 Given a repeated game (G, l) and assume that for each agent
i hi(G) ≥ 2 · shi(G), then a rationally competitive strategy for agent i in the
game (G, l) is obtained by performing the competitive strategy of it in G on
iterations 1, 2, . . . , l−1 and performing the rational competitive strategy of it
in G on the last iteration.
Basic idea behind proof: From the perspective of agent i, assuming we are at
stage k < l, the selection of any strategy s of G by j can be complemented
to a non-dominated strategy of j; this non-dominated strategy will tell j
to choose the strategy associated with hj(G) in stages k + 1, . . . , l. The
reason that the resulting strategy is not dominated is that j considers the
strategy where i will also choose in stages k+1, . . . , l the strategy (of his) in
G that corresponds to hj(G), and does it only if in stage k agent j chooses
s; in addition, according to this strategy i will choose the strategy that
4This definition is in the spirit of sub-game perfect equilibrium in game theory.
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corresponds to shj(G) is stage k. This implies that agent i should consider
at stages 1, 2, . . . , l−1 all possible strategies of agent j in G. In the last stage
agent i is no longer subject to the above considerations and will choose the
rationally competitive strategy of G.
The above theorem shows a strong connection between competitive anal-
ysis in repeated games and competitive analysis in simple single-shot games.
As it turns out, this connection can be further generalized to a much richer
context:
Definition 5.2 Let G¯ = (G1, G2, . . . , Gm) be a sequence of games where N
is the set of players in each of the games in the sequence, and game Gi is
played in iteration i. The strategy of agent t in G¯ determines its strategy in
Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, as a function of the strategies of Gj, 1 ≤ j < i, selected by
the other agents in previous iterations. Given a tuple of strategies of G¯, one
for each agent, the payoff of agent i is taken as the sum of its payoffs in the
m iterations.
Theorem 5.2 Given a sequence of games G¯ = (G1, G2, . . . , Gm) where N is
the set of players in each of the games in the sequence, and game Gj is played
in iteration j, and assume that hi(Gk) ≥ 2 · shi(Gl) for every 1 ≤ k, l ≤ m,
and for every agent i, then a rationally competitive strategy for agent i in the
game G¯ is obtained by performing the competitive strategy of Gj in iterations
1, 2, . . . , l − 1 and performing the rational competitive strategy of Gm in the
last iteration.
The above theorem can be generalized into a situation where n games
from among the set of games {G1, G2, . . . , Gm} are executed in some random
order (with possible repetitions). Formally, this can be captured by the
following definition and theorem:
Definition 5.3 Given a set of games G = {G1, G2, . . . , Gm}, a random
game with respect to G, G¯, is a sequence of n games (g1, g2, . . . , gn), where
gi ∈ G (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and N is the set of players in each of the games in
the sequence. The game to be played in iteration i, gi, is randomly selected
from the set G independently of previous selections made. The strategy of
agent t in G¯ determines its strategy in gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as a function of
the strategies of gj, 1 ≤ j < i, selected by the other agents in previous
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iterations. Given a tuple of strategies of G¯, one for each agent, the payoff
of agent t is taken as the sum of its payoffs in the n iterations. A sub-game
of a random game G¯ with respect to G, is a random game with respect to G
that starts from iteration 1 ≤ j ≤ n and consists of n − j + 1 iterations as
above. A (rationally) competitive strategy in a random game is required to be
a (rationally) competitive strategy at each sub-game of it.
Theorem 5.3 Given a random game G¯ with respect to G = {G1, G2, . . . , Gm},
and assume that hi(Gk) ≥ 2 · shi(Gl) for every 1 ≤ k, l ≤ m, and for ev-
ery agent i, then a rationally competitive strategy for agent i in the game
G¯ is obtained by performing the competitive strategy of game gi in iterations
1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and performing the rational competitive strategy of the game
gn on the last iteration in the sequence.
6 One-way trading in multi-agent systems
In the previous section we have discussed competitive analysis for multi-agent
systems in the framework of general repeated games and random games. In
this section we look at a particular variant of repeated games that extends a
well known and fundamental framework for competitive analysis – the one-
way trading (see citations in chapter 14 of [3]).
One way to present the structure of one-way trading is as follows. An
agent a seeks buying X units of a good or of a service. A supplier A wishes
to supply these units of good to a. The agents act in an environment that
determines the actual payment for a unit of good in a non-deterministic way.
For example, the payments might be specified in dollars, but since agent A is
a British company the actual payoffs it will obtain for providing the good will
depend on the exchange ratio of the dollar and the British pound. Formally,
the environment announces at each point in time, 1, 2, . . . , t, the payoff that
will be obtained by agent A for supplying a unit of good. The announcements
are selected in an unpredicted non-deterministic manner from the interval
[m,M ], where M > m > 0. For example, when K is announced at point
i, agent A can supply the X units of good and obtain a payoff of X · K.
Our assumption is that agent A will obtain a zero payoff by not providing
the units of good. The decision problem that agent A faces is as follows: at
each point he needs to decide whether he would like to supply the units of
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good in the current rate. We assume that when agent A is willing to provide
the service then he will provide and be paid for the whole quantity of goods
requested by agent a (this property is termed one-way search).
The competitive analysis approach tells agent A in the above scenario to
minimize his regret value. As it turns out, the competitive strategy in this
case will tell the agent to accept the offer (i.e supply the units of good) when
the payoff reaches M−m
2
in stage j ≤ t− 1, and to accept the offer on stage t
otherwise.
One-way trading is a typical setting for the use of competitive analysis.
We now extend it to the case of several agents, where more than one agent
may wish to supply the units of good requested by a. We will first develop
the multi-agent framework without considering the rationality assumption,
and then will extend it to the case of rational competitive analysis.
6.1 Multi-agent one-way trading
For ease of exposition we consider the case of trading two agents (i.e. two
suppliers who can provide the units of good requested by a): A1 and A2. The
payment offers for the two agents are taken to be independent. For example,
agent 1 may be a British company and agent 2 may be a Japanese company,
and therefore the actual payment offers for them (from their perspective)
will reflect the exchange ratio between the dollar and the British pound, and
the exchange ratio between the dollar and the Japanese Yen, respectively.
Formally, we have:
Definition 6.1 Let M1,M2, m1, m2, t, X = 2K be positive integers, where
M1 > m1 and M2 > m2, t ≥ 3, and X is even. A multi-agent one way
trading T = 〈N = {1, 2}, X, t,m1,M1, m2,M2〉 is a random game with the
following players, strategies, and payoffs:
1. The players are 1 and 2.
2. There are t iterations. Each iteration i is associated with a pair of
numbers (a1, a2) where m1 ≤ a1 ≤ M1 and m2 ≤ a2 ≤ M2. At each
iteration each agent can ”take” or ”pass”. However, if an agent takes
in iteration j then both agents can only ”pass” in all iterations j ≥ i.
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3. The payoff of each agent in iteration i is 0 if it passes; if an agent
performs ”take” in iteration i then its payoff will be aiX if the other
agent passes and aiK if the other agent takes.
Intuitively, ”take” means a decision of accepting the offer, while ”pass”
means rejecting it (at the given point). If both agents agree to ”take” then
each one of them will supply half of the units (and the payoff will be splitted
among the agents). We now show what is the structure of the competitive
strategy in a multi-agent one-way trading setting.
Theorem 6.1 Given a multi-agent one way trading T = 〈N = {1, 2}, X, t,m1,M1, m2,M2〉,
a competitive strategy for agent i is as follows:
1. For iterations 1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1, take iff ai ≥
2Mi+mi
4
2. If you arrive at iteration t then take.
Basic idea behind proof: Consider iteration j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t−1, and consider the
announcement ai = Y . Then, by taking in round j, agent i might suffer a
regret of 2MiK−2Y K (notice that there is a regret when an agent takes only
if the other does not take at that iteration). By not taking in stage j agent i
might suffer a regret of 2Y K−miK (which is in factmax(KY, 2Y K−miK)).
In order to minimize the regret agent i will therefore have to take whenever
Y satisfies that 2MiK − 2Y K = 2Y K −miK, i.e. when ai =
2Mi+mi
4
. The
fact that the regret is minimized in iteration t by taking rather than passing
is immediate.
6.2 Rational competitive analysis for multi-agent one
way trading
We now show the result of applying rational competitive analysis to the
context of multi-agent one way trading:
Theorem 6.2 Given a multi-agent one way trading T = 〈N = {1, 2}, X, t,m1,M1, m2,M2〉,
a rational competitive strategy for agent i is as follows:
1. For iterations 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1, if the other agent, k, is announced that
ak = Mk, then take.
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2. For iterations 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 2, if (1) does not hold then take iff ai ≥
2Mi+mi
4
3. If (1) does not hold, then in iteration t− 1 take iff ai ≥
Mi+mi
4
.
4. If you arrive at iteration t then take.
Basic idea behind proof: Notice that if the other agent, k, is announced that
ak = Mk then taking dominates any other strategy of it. In no other cases
we can say that taking or passing in iterations 1, 2, . . . , t − 1 is dominated.
Also, in stage t passing is dominated by taking. As a result we will get that
agent i will minimize its regret by taking when ak =Mk or when it arrived in
the last iteration. Assume that ai = Y in iteration t− 1, then the maximal
regret we get by taking is MiK − 2KY , and by passing the maximal regret
in this case is 2KY −miK (which is in fact max(KY, 2KY −miK)). This
implies that the regret is minimized when MiK−2Y K = 2KY −miK ), i.e.
when Y = Mi+mi
4
. The other case that refers to iterations 1, 2, . . . , t− 2 will
be treated as in the case of (standard) competitive analysis.
7 Conclusion
Competitive analysis is a major tool in computer science, which has been
used in a variety of contexts. In this paper we have introduced rational
competitive analysis. Rational competitive analysis generalizes competitive
analysis to the context of multi-agent systems. Moreover, we have shown its
use in the context of bidding games and one-way trading, two problems of
considerable importance, as well as in the context of general repeated games.
Our approach adopts the non-Bayesian normative approach adopted in pre-
vious work, but modifies it to incorporate minimal rationality requirements.
Such requirements are essential in multi-agent domains. Many of the previ-
ous studies in the context of competitive analysis can be naturally extended
to multi-agent domains, and then rational competitive analysis can serve as
a fundamental tool for the study of these extensions. We see the study of
such extensions as a most attractive research topic, and hope that others will
join us in addressing this challenge.
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